

*POSITION PAPER 1*  
*SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND BASIC MODELS (BASED ON APPLICATION)*

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This position paper is based on the Orpheus application (including Dropbox). The aim of this paper is to facilitate

- discussion on basis concepts and ideas in the Orpheus project
- linking these concepts and models to the different prevention practices in our countries
- the development of a joint 'Orpheus language' between the partners and within the involved networks

The paper has three parts

1. scientific evidence
2. the puzzle model on 'radicalisation'
3. the prevention pyramid

After each part a discussion box introduces two or three key questions.

These boxes can be used to prepare the plenary discussion during the next Orpheus meeting.

## 1. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (IN THE ORPHEUS APPLICATION)

### - THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF A MAINSTREAM 'RADICALISATION' CONCEPT.

After the Twin Towers attack (2001) it became difficult for experts on terrorism to discuss 'root causes' because American commentators dismissed this as an excuse and justification for the killing of innocent civilians. By introducing the concept of 'radicalisation', developed mainly by an EU-expert group (Coolsaet, 2008), the discussion could be reopened (Sedgwick, 2010). After attacks in Western cities by homegrown terrorists, the focus shifted to an inland process of radicalisation by Muslim youth, mixed with debates on failed integration (Kundnani, 2012, Schmid, 2013). This shift increases risks of stigmatisation of Muslim communities, polarisation in society and disregarding other types of political violence.

=> **ORPHEUS strictly targets 'radicalisation to political violence' as the security threat, focusing on all sorts of political violence regardless of ideological background.**

### - THE WEAKNESS OF MAINSTREAM EXPLANATORY PROCESS MODELS.

Mainstream explanation models describe a process consisting of sequential steps, leading towards political violence and terrorism (Muro, 2016; Moghaddam, 2005; Borum 2011). These linear process models are commonly used but fail to grasp the diverse paths and timing towards political violence ('flash radicalisation, petty crime...'). Hafez & Mullins (2015) did not find evidence for this process model and suggest a puzzle metaphor based on the interdependence of four components: grievances, networks, ideologies, and enabling environment and support structures.

=> **ORPHEUS builds upon this puzzle model to tackle the interplay of three (offline and online) causal factors by strengthening positive networks for young people; offering legitimate channels for expressing grievances; promoting inclusive alter-narratives on society - see Visualisation of the project logic.**

### - THE WEAKNESS OF THE MAINSTREAM FOCUS ON RADICAL BELIEFS AS START OF A RADICALISATION PROCESS.

In the dominant narrative, radical (religious) ideology is seen as the starting point of a process towards terrorism. Academic evidence against this narrative is growing. John Horgan (2013), director of the 'International Centre for the study of Terrorism' concludes: "[First] the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in violence. And second, there is increasing evidence that people who engage in terrorism don't necessary hold radical beliefs". Ideology provides at most a legitimisation for violence or plays an enabling role in cohering a group."

=> **ORPHEUS does not want to make the mistake to consider 'radical beliefs' as a proxy for the threat of political violence, but accepts the need of public expression of grievances as an important part of prevention efforts.**

### - THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL ALIENATION AND FRUSTRATION AS RISK FACTORS.

There is a large amount of evidence that relative disadvantage and deprivation is a driver towards political violence. A broad quantitative study of country-level data from 172 countries concluded clearly that countries with more economic discrimination of minority communities are more vulnerable to domestic terrorism (Piazza, 2011). The perception of deprivation, discrimination and marginalisation has also been identified as important. See the ethnographic study by Garland & Treadwell (Abbas & Siddique, 2012). Official policies on 'counter radicalisation' have been identified as a driver of perceived discrimination (De Bie, 2016). In a research summary Miller & Chauhan (in Colaert, 2017) conclude: "Both the subjective perception and objective existence of unfairness, discrimination and injustice can be important drivers of violent behaviour both when it objectively exists and when it is perceived."

=> **ORPHEUS tackles social alienation and frustration as risk factor for political violence. The reconnection with social institutions and the politicisation of grievances are important goals to reduce the risk of radicalisation.**

Item	PROBLEMATIC PREVENTION APPROACH	CHALLENGES	ORPHEUS SOLUTIONS (APPLICATION)
<b>Central safety threat</b>	'Muslim radicalisation'	Stigmatisation of Muslim population Neglect of other political violence (e.g. extreme right)	All sorts of 'Political violence'
<b>Explanation Metaphor</b>	Linear process (stages)	Failure to handle diverse paths and timing towards political violence (e.g. 'flash radicalisation, petty crime...')	<b>Puzzle model</b> with elements: ideology, grievances, networks, context
<b>Ideology</b>	Radical beliefs as starting point	No strong link radical beliefs – political violence Ideology as just one factor (legitimation, binding...) Neglect of other risk factors	Broader focus: not only ideology (alter-narratives) but also - Grievances: channels for expression - Networks: social bonding
<b>Prevention approach</b>	Early detection of 'individuals' at risk'	Neglect of social prevention in the community Individuals feel (unfairly) targeted	Broad integral <b>prevention pyramid</b>
<b>Main target group</b>	Vulnerable (Muslim) youth	Diversity of profiles (e.g. well-off right extremists)	Young citizens at risk of <b>social alienation</b>
<b>Steering</b>	Police/security forces	One sided securitarian approach	Frontline workers co-creating with young people
<b>Role of frontline workers</b>	Risk assessment	Undermining pedagogical relation (trust bond)	Respect for pedagogical role based on trust
<b>Role of young people</b>	Object of prevention	Negative reactions, feel targeted, disempowered	Young people as subjects, actors, equal citizens

**DISCUSSION BOX**


<p><b>Which of these challenges are the most problematic in the prevention practice in your local/national context?</b></p>	
<p><b>Is the target group of the prevention work in Orpheus recognisable in your practice/local or national context?</b></p>	
<p><b>What are the 2 or 3 most important solutions you want to find through this Orpheus project?</b></p>	

## 2. BEYOND THE MAINSTREAM PROCESS MODEL OF RADICALISATION: THE PUZZLE MODEL

The majority of explanation models describe a **process consisting of sequential steps**, leading towards political violence and terrorism (Muro, 2016; Vidino, 2011; Moghaddam, 2005; Helfstein, 2012; Borum, 2005).

**All these linear process models are well-known and broadly used but fail to grasp the unpredictable and diverse paths and timings towards political violence** (e.g. ‘flash radicalisation, petty crime...’).

In an extensive summary of recent empirical literature on the causes and dynamics of radicalisation, Hafez & Mullins did not find evidence to justify this orderly image of a process. They suggest a **‘puzzle’ metaphor based on the combination of four components**: grievances, networks, ideologies, enabling environment and support structures. They stress the interdependencies between these variables: “Just as similarly structured jigsaw puzzles can reveal different images once their pieces are interconnected, cases of radicalization can exhibit tremendous diversity even when the variables of radicalization are reoccurring. The puzzle metaphor is also useful to highlight the interdependent nature of radicalization variables, where one piece of the puzzle contains elements of the adjacent pieces.” (Hafez & Mullins, 2015)



Orpheus builds upon this puzzle model to tackle the interplay of three (offline and online) causal factors of political violence by:

- strengthening positive networks for young people;
- offering legitimate channels for the public expression of grievances;
- promoting inclusive alter-narratives on society.


The interplay of these three factors also inspires our approach of ‘safe spaces’ in the application:

“A safe space will be a location where young people can meet each other, supported by professionals they trust. In safe spaces delicate topics can be addressed comfortably, young people are stimulated to engage in social institutions, and are supported in the public expression of grievances. These safe spaces are organised in such a way that they enable us to offer a pedagogical support as opposed to a disproportional repressive reaction.”

**DISCUSSION BOX**

<p><b>How would you describe the interplay of factors in the current prevention work in your practice/local or national context?</b></p>	
<p><b>Is the target group of the prevention work in Orpheus recognisable in your practice/local or national context?</b></p>	

### 3. PREVENTION PYRAMID



*Framework for the integral prevention of radicalization towards political violence - Görgöz, Vanhove & Van Bouchaute, elaborated on the model of Deklerck, J. (2006)*

### Typical characteristics of the prevention pyramid model

This model is an **integrated model** for all kinds of prevention work. The pyramid is reference framework for developing prevention policies and practices aiming at a **combination of general and specific measures** within an integrated approach.

The pyramid metaphor suggests that all prevention work starts from the ground level of the **broader societal context**: specific prevention practices are considered as part of improving the quality of social life of citizens in democratic inclusive societies. Or to put it the other way round: prevention policies and practices should not disrupt or deteriorate this quality of social life... Prevention work should have a special and critical attention to the general living conditions in society.

**Characteristics of this model** are:

- It is **not a phased of tiered approach** of prevention and it does not involve the idea of a cascading sequence of prevention efforts in time. On the contrary, the model starts from the analysis of a problem and leads to appropriate actions on different levels with special attention to avoid counterproductive effects of some (more problem oriented) measures on other prevention levels
- The model makes a clear distinction between **problem** oriented (negative) versus **wellbeing** oriented (positive) prevention approach
- The model **differentiates five levels of prevention**, from general to specific prevention; making the difference with direct intervention and curation as the reactive part of integral prevention
- The whole pyramid rests upon the **ground level** of the societal context, what means that good prevention work is embedded in efforts to improve the quality of life in a broader societal context
- On the different prevention levels distinction is made between working on
  - Influencing the **attitudes** of the involved actors (on the different levels): sensibilisation, conscientisation, participation and consultation, information, increasing involvement of citizens and field workers...
  - developing **structural** measures that have impact on the context of the involved actors: we make a distinction between organisational measures (roadmaps, alarm procedures, protocols, ...) technical measures (safeguarding, control of risk zones... ) and policy measures (equality of opportunity in education, discrimination testing programs, neighbourhood renewal, implementing new social services...)

The model has been implemented in prevention of violence in schools or neighbourhoods and thus is useful as a framework for our project ambitions in Orpheus. In the application we wrote:

- **WP 1 (safe spaces):** “In our integral prevention pyramid model this package focuses on general and specific prevention (level 2 and 3) with a positive effect on fundamental prevention.”
- **WP 2 (online):** “In our integral prevention pyramid model, this WP focuses on specific prevention (level 3) and direct intervention (level 4) with a positive effect on general prevention (level 2). Through cross-border cooperation between the PPs, the higher level will feed the lower level of the prevention pyramid and vice versa. The information of experts on alter-narratives can offer input for the grooming awareness and resilience workshops.

The model of the prevention pyramid helps us to map, analyse and evaluate the prevention measures.



<b>(1) Fundamental prevention</b>	<b>(2) General prevention</b>	<b>(3) Specific prevention</b>	<b>(4) Direct intervention</b>	<b>(5) Curation, mitigation &amp; rehabilitation</b>
<i>Improving the general quality of life in an inclusive society</i>	<i>Prevent risks by approaching the problem broad and positive</i>	<i>Reduce risk by responding directly to risk factors</i>	<i>Prevent escalation and damage</i>	<i>Restrict negative effects</i>
<p>Although this dimension of prevention is often forgotten, it is essential for a good result of any other prevention measure on the other levels. Both the analysis and the approach are not problem but wellbeing oriented. In other words: this is a strategy of indirect prevention. We can think of measures in the field of social, education, economic, safety... policies.</p>	<p>The problem of increasing political violence in society is acknowledged but the prevention approach is wellbeing oriented. The aim of the positive approach is to avoid that groups are stigmatised, with more social frustration and self-stigmatisation as a counterproductive effect - a causal factor for political violence.</p>	<p>Prevention measures are directly targeted on a specific problem. Both analysis and approach are problem oriented. This is a direct prevention approach. The problem of political violence is acknowledged. To lower that risk the measures are specifically targeted to counteract specific risk factors causing political violence.</p>	<p>The risk for political violence to happen in society is clear and present. The aim of prevention in reaction to the immediate threat is to prevent a further escalation. Different intervention techniques are used.</p>	<p>The negative problem has already occurred. The effects of the problem have to be 'cured'. Both the analysis of the situation and the prevention approach is problem oriented. The goals of curation are to prevent the problem or situation of becoming worse and to have a quick and effective answer to the negative effects</p>
<p><i>Examples:</i></p> <p><i>active non-discrimination policies, politicians promoting inclusive city with equal citizens, promotion of civil rights and human rights (association, free speech...), quality of services and education, high levels of work in dignity, community based policing, ...</i></p>	<p><i>Examples:</i></p> <p><i>support legitimate channels for expressing grievances, training educators in their pedagogical role of having 'difficult conversations' in safe spaces based on a trust relationship, invest in support networks for vulnerable groups, improve the quality and quantity of public space, improving the quality &amp; quantity and accessibility of leisure time facilities, , ...</i></p>	<p><i>Examples:</i></p> <p><i>resilience training programs with specific youth groups at risk, individual trajectories with vulnerable youngsters, protocol of cooperation between services, security policies in a city or district, juridical action against hate speech, strict and swift repression of hate crimes, promoting alter-narratives...</i></p>	<p><i>Examples:</i></p> <p><i>time-outs, online intervention to disturb recruiting networks, individual trajectories with persons using hate speech, discussions with professionals to find a better way of reacting, ...</i></p>	<p><i>Examples:</i></p> <p><i>exit programs for convicted terrorists, dismantling supporting networks after attacks...</i></p>

**DISCUSSION BOX**

**On which level of prevention are the current prevention activities in your organisation/local or national context situated**

**On which new levels do you want to develop prevention practices within the Orpheus project?**

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